Illusionism, Moore, and Chalmers.
Frontiers in psychology January 1, 2024 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1449314 via PubMed
Summary
G. E. Moore's 1939 proof of an external world is defended against David Chalmers's criticisms, including Chalmers's 2022 claim that Moore's original argument was wrong and his 2018 Moorean argument against illusionism about consciousness. The paper argues that Chalmers's Moorean argument fails to refute illusionism, and that Moore's original argument withstands Chalmers-style objections.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Chalmers Consciousness Illusionism The moorean argument |
| Citations | 2 |
| Key finding | Moore's original proof of an external world is defensible against Chalmers's criticisms, and Chalmers's Moorean argument does not refute illusionism. |
Abstract
In 1939, G. E. Moore presented his famous proof of an external world. In 2018, David Chalmers published his Moorean argument against illusionism. In 2022, Chalmers argued that Moore's original argument was wrong. In this paper, I will try to defend the original Moore's argument against Chalmers-style criticism, and show that Chalmers's Moorean argument against illusionism cannot refute illusionism.