Episodic memory without autonoetic consciousness.

Summary

Since Tulving's 1985 article, autonoetic consciousness has been considered necessary for episodic memory. This paper challenges that claim, arguing that the construct of autonoetic consciousness lacks validity and, even if valid, would not be necessary for episodic memory. It proposes returning to a functional or computational characterization of episodic memory, where its characteristic phenomenology is a contingent feature of retrieval and open to empirical study. This approach aligns with memory taxonomies independent of conscious awareness and suggests ways to evaluate variability in conscious experience of episodic memories across humans and non-human agents.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Ever since Tulving's influential 1985 article 'Memory and consciousness', it has become traditional to think of autonoetic consciousness as necessary for episodic memory. This paper questions this claim. Specifically, it argues that the construct of autonoetic consciousness lacks validity and that, even if it was valid, it would still not be necessary for episodic memory. The paper ends with a proposal to go back to a functional/computational characterization of episodic memory in which its characteristic phenomenology is a contingent feature of the retrieval process and, as a result, open to empirical scrutiny. The proposal also dovetails with recent taxonomies of memory that are independent of conscious awareness and suggests strategies to evaluate within- and between-individual variability in the conscious experience of episodic memories in human and non-human agents. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.