Consciousness isn't "hard"-it's human psychology that makes it so!

Summary

Consciousness may not be as distinct from the physical world as commonly believed. In a study with 400 participants, findings revealed that in certain scenarios, 60% viewed consciousness as linked to physical processes in the brain. Additionally, "problem intuitions," often seen as evidence for dualism and essentialism, were found to be influenced by psychological biases, suggesting they do not accurately reflect the nature of consciousness. This indicates that understanding consciousness requires exploring the psychological mechanisms behind these intuitions.

Abstract

Consciousness arguably presents a "hard problem" for scholars. An influential position asserts that the "problem" is rooted in ontology-it arises because consciousness "is" distinct from the physical. "Problem intuitions" are routinely taken as evidence for this view. In so doing, it is assumed that (i) people do not consider consciousness as physical and (ii) their intuitions faithfully reflect what exists (or else, intuitions would not constitute evidence). New experimental results challenge both claims. First, in some scenarios, people demonstrably view consciousness as a physical affair that registers in the body (brain). Second, "problem intuitions" are linked to psychological biases, so they cannot be trusted to reflect what consciousness is. I conclude that the roots of the "hard problem" are partly psychological. Accordingly, its resolution requires careful characterization of the psychological mechanisms that engender "problem intuitions."

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