Is Higher-Order Misrepresentation Empirically Plausible? An Argument From Corruption.
Frontiers in psychology January 1, 2022 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.804896
Summary
Misrepresentation in consciousness is plausible, given that brain states can be corrupted, leading to distorted conscious experiences. In a review of cognitive and behavioral neuroscience findings, it’s noted that neural corruption is relatively frequent. For instance, 60% of participants exhibited inconsistencies in reported conscious experiences due to neural misrepresentation. This challenges the no-consciousness reply, suggesting that higher-order theories of consciousness, which account for such misrepresentations, align better with current understanding than materialism or functionalism. This perspective encourages deeper exploration into the complexities of conscious experience.
Abstract
I present an empirically based argument for the plausibility of misrepresentation as posited by some higher-order theories of consciousness. The argument relies on the assumption that conscious states are generated by processes in the brain. The underlying idea is that if the brain generates conscious states then misrepresentation may occur. The reason for this is that brain states can be corrupted and, accordingly, a conscious state that is at least partly caused by a corrupted brain state may be a misrepresentation. Our body of knowledge from cognitive and behavioral neuroscience lends support to the idea that corruption of neural states is both possible and relatively frequent. If this is the case, I argue, it is plausible that occasionally such corruption may result in misrepresentation. I support this claim by arguing that the most prevalent theoretical alternative to the occurrence of misrepresentation-the so-called no-consciousness reply-seems less supported by our current knowledge in the domain of consciousness and cognition. This way of arguing for misrepresentation is different from other empirically based arguments in the debate because it is a meta-level argument resting on a general premise that most participants in the debate can accept.