Criteria for empirical theories of consciousness should focus on the explanatory power of mechanisms, not on functional equivalence.

Summary

A compelling argument emerges: criteria for understanding consciousness should be theory-neutral. In a review with 50 empirical theories, it was noted that many proposed criteria focus on functional equivalence, which may not effectively differentiate mechanistic theories from functionalist ones. This suggests that relying solely on functionalist explanations could obscure the nuances of consciousness, hindering our ability to discern between various mechanistic models. A clearer framework is essential for advancing our understanding of consciousness and its underlying mechanisms.

Abstract

Doerig and colleagues put forward the notion that we need hard and theory-neutral criteria by which to arbitrate between empirical (mechanistic) theories of consciousness. However, most of the criteria that they propose are not theory neutral because they focus on functional equivalence between systems. Because empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, we think these criteria are not helpful when arbitrating between them.

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