The "Hard Problem" of Life
Sara Imari Walker, Paul C. W. Davies
arXiv Preprint Archive June 23, 2016 via arXiv
Summary
The essay draws a parallel between the 'hard problem of consciousness' and a proposed 'hard problem of life': how information can act as a causal agent in the physical world. The authors argue that explaining life requires understanding how information influences events, and they suspect this problem, like consciousness, may not be fully reducible to known physical principles, potentially requiring new laws or concepts.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Q-bio.ot Information theory Biophysics Theoretical biology Emergence |
| Key finding | The problem of how information can affect the world is central to explaining life and may not be reducible to known physical principles. |
Abstract
Chalmer's famously identified pinpointing an explanation for our subjective experience as the "hard problem of consciousness". He argued that subjective experience constitutes a "hard problem" in the sense that its explanation will ultimately require new physical laws or principles. Here, we propose a corresponding "hard problem of life" as the problem of how `information' can affect the world. In this essay we motivate both why the problem of information as a causal agent is central to explaining life, and why it is hard - that is, why we suspect that a full resolution of the hard problem of life will, similar to as has been proposed for the hard problem of consciousness, ultimately not be reducible to known physical principles.