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Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument

Uriah Kriegel

Canadian Journal of Philosophy March 1, 2003 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2003.10716537

Summary

The paper discusses the ambiguity of the term 'consciousness' and introduces a specific term, 'intransitive self-consciousness,' to clarify its meaning. This new term refers to a particular type of self-awareness. The discussion aims to provide a clearer understanding of self-consciousness in philosophical contexts.

Study at a glance

Key finding The author introduces 'intransitive self-consciousness' as a way to clarify the ambiguous term 'consciousness.'

Abstract

The word ‘consciousness’ is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it isnota term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I am going to discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities of the word ‘consciousness,’ I will introduce a term of art:intransitive self-consciousness.As the term suggests, the phenomenon I have in mind is a kind of self-consciousness, or self-awareness.

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