Russellian Monism
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.14
Summary
Russellian monism addresses the problem of consciousness through various perspectives on the properties of basic physical entities. Two main forms are identified: panpsychist, which posits that these entities have experiential properties, and panprotopsychist, which suggests they possess proto-experiential properties that contribute to the emergence of consciousness. The discussion is divided into two parts, focusing first on panpsychism and then on panprotopsychism.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | Russellian monism can be categorized into panpsychist and panprotopsychist forms based on the nature of the properties of basic physical entities. |
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Abstract
Russellian monism is a quite general approach to the problem of consciousness, which comes in a variety of forms depending on what is said about the categorical properties of basic physical entities. We can usefully distinguish between panpsychist and panprotopsychist forms. Panpsychist Russellian monists hold that the categorical properties of basic physical entities are experiential properties. Panprotopsychist Russellian monists hold that the categorical properties of basic physical entities are proto-experiential, where proto-experiential properties are not themselves experiential properties but are crucial ingredients in facts that explain the production of consciousness. The first half of this chapter will discuss panpsychist forms of Russellian monism, the second half will discuss panprotopsychist forms.