The philosophy of phenomenal consciousness
Advances in Consciousness Research June 17, 2015 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1075/aicr.92.11dra
Summary
Phenomenal consciousness, which refers to the subjective experience of being aware, poses challenges for scientific explanation due to its first-person nature. This aspect of consciousness is private and unique to individuals, making it hard to align with the objective data typically favored in science. The introduction discusses the nature of phenomenal consciousness and examines philosophical arguments regarding whether an explanation for its properties can be found.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The study highlights the difficulty of reconciling the subjective nature of phenomenal consciousness with objective scientific methods. |
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Abstract
The scientific study of consciousness is constantly making new discoveries, but one particular aspect of consciousness remains problematic to explain. This is the fact that conscious experiences present themselves to us in a first-person way: there is something it feels like to be the subject of a conscious experience. This ‘phenomenal’ aspect of consciousness seems to be subjective, private, and knowable in a special way, making it difficult to reconcile with the scientific focus on objective, third-person data. This introduction provides an overview of phenomenal consciousness, explores philosophical arguments about its nature, and considers whether or not we should expect to find an explanation for the properties of phenomenal consciousness.