The Twin Cognitive Cycle: A Unified Framework to Explore the Subjectivity of Consciousness, Excessive Neural Activations found in NCC Research, and the Free Will Debate

Summary

A new framework called the Twin Cognitive Cycle (TCC) is proposed to address issues related to consciousness, including subjectivity and delayed awareness. The TCC suggests that consciousness arises from a unique pattern of global activation influenced by cognitive regions and constraints. This model indicates that conscious states are inherently subjective and unique, and it challenges interpretations of Libet's experiments by suggesting that delayed consciousness does not provide evidence for or against free will.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This study introduces a unified framework for addressing several open questions concerning consciousness, including subjectivity and awareness, the confounding findings of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) research, and the phenomenon of delayed consciousness observed in Libet’s free-will experiments. The framework, named the Twin Cognitive Cycle (TCC), is derived from an executable system capable of learning from experience and generating semantic reports in response to external inputs. In the TCC model, consciousness emerges from the unique pattern of a global activation. The number of possible patterns arises from the combination of a constrained macro-distribution of common features and an unconstrained exponential micro-state space spanning the underlying modality space. Because both operate continuously, every conscious state is inherently unique and therefore subjective. A TCC may involve a sequence of five staged activations across four cognitive regions, with the activation intensity and the regions involved varying depending on the applied constraints. The former aligns well with the multi-peaked ERP waveforms observed in NCC studies, while the latter is consistent with fMRI findings from no-report paradigms. In the TCC model, consciousness influences decision-making only in the subsequent TCC, suggesting that interpretations of Libet’s experiments are flawed if the causal effects on later decision-making are not explored. In other words, delayed consciousness does not constitute evidence either for or against free will.

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