Minds Matter
Joseph Gottlieb, Jacob Berger, Bob Fischer
Utilitas June 11, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1017/s0953820826100338 via OpenAlex
Summary
The relationship between consciousness and welfare is examined, particularly through the lens of phenomenalism, which posits that consciousness is essential for being better or worse off. Two accounts are discussed: one suggesting consciousness is necessary for welfare subjecthood, and another claiming that conscious beings have a greater capacity for welfare. However, it is argued that hedonism, a common support for these views, does not provide any backing for phenomenalism. An alternative perspective called mentalism is proposed, focusing on mentality instead of consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | Hedonism provides no support for the claims of phenomenalism regarding the relationship between consciousness and welfare. |
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Abstract
Abstract Many claim that there is an important relationship between consciousness and welfare. Call this general view phenomenalism . One way of fleshing out phenomenalism is to hold that consciousness is what makes one the type of entity that can be noninstrumentally better or worse off in the first place. Consciousness is at least a necessary condition on welfare subjecthood . A different account holds that even if consciousness is not necessary for welfare subjecthood, conscious welfare subjects have a greater welfare capacity . We argue that the most likely source of support for either version of phenomenalism – hedonism about welfare goods and bads – provides no support at all. Along the way, we discuss an alternative view of welfare subjectivity and welfare capacity that does not appeal to consciousness but only to mentality, a view we call mentalism .