The Categorical Failures of Higher-Order Theories (of Consciousness)

Summary

Higher-order theories of consciousness (HOT) are argued to be a labeling scheme rather than a true theory, as they establish a one-way relation between mental states without operationalization or specific physical implementation. While the findings related to consciousness are real, HOT cannot explain them due to its structural failures, including the regress problem. Defenses of HOT rely on external additions that do not stem from the theory itself.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Higher-order theories of consciousness (HOT) propose that a mental state M is conscious if and only if a higher-order state H represents M. This paper argues HOT is a labeling scheme rather than a theory of consciousness. HOT specifies a one-way relation between two mental states, applies the label "conscious" to whatever fits the relation, and supplies the actual states, the physical material, and the empirical evidence informally as the argument requires. Because HOT refuses to commit to any specific physical implementation and because the central relational claim is bare, HOT cannot earn the right to cite the empirical findings its defenders use as confirmation. The findings are real; HOT, as it stands, cannot explain them. The diagnosis is developed by examining four positions HOT must hold to count as a theory of consciousness. The states M and H are named only in terms of each other, with no operationalization on either side. The relation between them has no analog in working scientific theory, takes the third-person observer's stance to do its work, and is assembled from materials borrowed from phenomenology, semantic theory, folk psychology, and logic, each stripped of the commitment that supported it in its source domain. No mechanism converts the holding of the relation into a property of M. The theory's defenses come from outside the theory, since the bare biconditional supplies no resources for blocking the regress, no resources for licensing empirical citations, and no resources for distinguishing M-H pairs that produce consciousness from those that do not. The regress problem, the oldest objection to HOT, is the visible sign of these structural failures. Rosenthal (2005), Brown (2015), Lau and Rosenthal (2011), and Carruthers (2000, 2011) each block the regress by adding something the bare biconditional does not contain (an asymmetry stipulation, content claims about the higher-order representation, signal detection apparatus, and a dispositional modal structure, respectively). The Bayesian variant earns its traction as a signal detection account; the HOT biconditional contributes nothing the signal detection mechanism does not already supply. The variants persist because each protects the bare biconditional from a different objection, and the protection operates in both directions. Unfalsifiability is achieved through variant-switching rather than through absorbing anomalies. **Keywords:** higher-order theories, consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, regress problem, metacognition, HOROR, Bayesian decision theory, falsifiability, theories of consciousness

Tags