How rich is consciousness? The partial awareness hypothesis.
Sid Kouider, Vincent De Gardelle, Jérôme Sackur, Emmanuel Dupoux
Trends in cognitive sciences July 1, 2010 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.04.006 via PubMed
Summary
The evidence supporting the idea of having rich 'phenomenal' consciousness without 'access' consciousness is unclear. It may stem from confusion between different types of consciousness or from illusions of richness in experiences. A new perspective is proposed that categorizes access to consciousness into a hierarchy of levels, suggesting that lower and higher levels can be accessed independently. This approach offers a simpler explanation for existing data and allows for studying the illusion of rich experiences through cognitive mechanisms.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The notion of dissociable forms of consciousness should be reframed as dissociable levels of access, providing a more straightforward account of the evidence. |
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Abstract
Current theories of consciousness posit a dissociation between 'phenomenal' consciousness (rich) and 'access' consciousness (limited). Here, we argue that the empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access is equivocal, resulting either from a confusion between phenomenal and unconscious contents, or from an impression of phenomenally rich experiences arising from illusory contents. We propose a refined account of access that relies on a hierarchy of representational levels and on the notion of partial awareness, whereby lower and higher levels are accessed independently. Reframing of the issue of dissociable forms of consciousness into dissociable levels of access provides a more parsimonious account of the existing evidence. In addition, the rich phenomenology illusion can be studied and described in terms of testable cognitive mechanisms.