Will there be a neuroscientific theory of consciousness?
M Kurthen, T Grunwald, C E Elger
Trends in cognitive sciences June 1, 1998 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/s1364-6613(98)01173-5 via PubMed
Summary
The problem of phenomenal consciousness is viewed as a scientific challenge, with some arguing that understanding brain function may not explain why consciousness exists. Current neuroscientific methods do not adequately address the 'explanatory gap' between brain processes and consciousness. However, it is suggested that this gap may be bridged by recognizing that our understanding of consciousness can change based on neuroscientific insights, prompting a shift in how consciousness is described.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | Neuroscientific approaches alone cannot resolve the explanatory gap regarding consciousness, but evolving descriptions of consciousness influenced by neuroscience may help address this issue. |
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Abstract
Neuroscientists and philosophers nowadays claim that the problem of phenomenal consciousness is a scientific problem. Increasing knowledge of the neural correlates of consciousness is expected to yield an explanation of consciousness in neuroscientific terms. On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that even complete knowledge of brain function will leave unanswered the question of why cerebral processes are accompanied by consciousness at all. Proponents of this view assume an unbridgeable `explanatory gap' between the brain and the whole realm of phenomenal consciousness. Here, it is argued that this `explanatory gap' problem can not adequately be met by current neuroscientific approaches to consciousness, while purely philosophical approaches remain controversial because they inevitably reach a level of contradictory intuitions that do not seem to be resolvable by further argument. However, the problem may be resolved once one accepts that the features of consciousness itself might change with our judgments and descriptions of consciousness inspired by neuroscience. Such a `change of consciousness' becomes realistic when consciousness is construed as a description-dependent, `non-intrinsic' property[1]. Hence, it is argued that neuroscientists are right not to try to refute the explanatory gap argument, but that they should continue research on the neural correlates of consciousness, thus preparing new descriptions of phenomenal consciousness.