The material constitution of phenomenal consciousness
Advances in Consciousness Research June 17, 2015 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1075/aicr.92.18per
Summary
The article presents a physicalist account of the mental, addressing arguments against physicalism by suggesting that introspection may misrepresent phenomenal states. It introduces a Russellian Monist perspective, proposing that unknown intrinsic physical properties underlie known microphysical properties and explain phenomenal consciousness. Additionally, it defends a nonreductive physicalist view where the relationship between the mental and microphysical is based on material constitution rather than identity.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The author defends a nonreductive physicalist account of the mental, emphasizing material constitution over identity in the relationship between the mental and microphysical. |
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Abstract
In this article I set out in concise form the physicalist account of the mental I develop in Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (Pereboom, 2011). I first set out a response to the knowledge and conceivability arguments against physicalism, one that features the open possibility that introspection represents phenomenal states as having qualitative features they actually lack. I then propose an alternative Russellian Monist answer to these arguments, according to which currently unknown absolutely intrinsic physical properties provide categorical bases for known microphysical properties and also yield an account of phenomenal consciousness. Lastly, I defend a nonreductive physicalist account of the mental, in which the fundamental relation between the mental and the microphysical is material constitution and not identity.