De-confounding the neural constitution of phenomenal consciousness from attention, report and memory

Summary

The chapter examines confounding factors that should be controlled when studying the neural basis of phenomenal conscious perception. It highlights previous studies that have distinguished between these confounds, particularly focusing on attention, report, and memory. Various phenomena and experimental methods are discussed, including aftereffects and change blindness, which may have their implications for consciousness theory affected by these confounding factors. The chapter also addresses the roles of report and memory in relation to phenomenal consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In this chapter, we discuss possible confounds that need to be carefully controlled for when the neural constitution of phenomenal conscious perception is studied. First, we discuss previous psychological or neural studies that clearly dissociated confounding factors (in particular, attention, report and memory) from phenomenal consciousness. We discuss several important phenomena and experimental methods (e.g., aftereffects, change blindness and inattentional blindness, and brain-imaging results) whose implications for the theory of consciousness might be contaminated by the influence of attention, report and memory. Finally, we discuss necessity and sufficiency of report and memory for phenomenal consciousness.