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Prospects for the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness

David Papineau

Thinking about Consciousness April 25, 2002 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/0199243824.003.0008

Summary

The discussion highlights that while brain research aims to uncover the material nature of conscious states, it may fall short in addressing the 'hard problem' of linking vague phenomenal concepts to specific material states. Additionally, the chapter examines Higher-Order Thought (HOT) and representational theories of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Key finding Scientific research may not fully resolve the 'hard problem' of connecting vague phenomenal concepts to identifiable material states.

Abstract

Abstract Many scientists hope that brain research will identify the material nature of conscious states. Papineau argues that when it comes to the “hard problem” of identifying the material referents of phenomenal concepts, scientific research can only take us so far. This is because phenomenal concepts are vague and do not point determinately to specific material states. This chapter also looks at Higher‐Order Thought (HOT) and representational accounts of consciousness.

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