Cognitive Naturalism and the Phenomenal Feel
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia December 28, 2015 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2015.0048 via DOAJ
Summary
The commentary critiques Sandro Nannini’s analogy between the shift in physics regarding time and the proposed shift in understanding phenomenal consciousness within cognitive naturalism. It argues that this approach fails to adequately address the subjective experience of conscious states and highlights key differences between the conceptual changes in time and consciousness. The commentary supports the eliminative materialist view that folk psychological concepts of consciousness should be abandoned.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The commentary argues that Nannini's cognitive naturalism cannot account for the phenomenal feel of conscious states. |
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Abstract
According to Sandro Nannini’s Time and Consciousness in Cognitive Naturalism, we can draw an analogy between the shift in the conception of time that occurred in physics with the introduction of relativity theory and a shift towards a scientifically more graspable functional concept of phenomenal consciousness. This analogy is meant to persuade us of the eliminative materialist view that we should abandon our folk psychological concept of consciousness. In my commentary, I examine the naturalization procedure underlying Nannini’s cognitive naturalism, argue for its inability to account for the phenomenal feel of conscious states, and point to some important differences between the conceptual change in the case of time and the intended change in the case of consciousness.