Immaginare e sperimentare. Gli zombie e il problema della coscienza fenomenica

Summary

The paper examines the significance of thought experiments in understanding phenomenal consciousness, highlighting their philosophical and scientific contexts. It discusses unresolved issues in scientific theories about consciousness and presents a case study on the zombie thought experiment, illustrating how this concept has sparked complex philosophical discussions. Overall, it emphasizes that philosophical inquiries into the mind are essential and should not be seen as secondary to cognitive science.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper focuses on the role and value of thought experiments concerning phenomenal consciousness. It is divided in two parts. The first part surveys the philosophical and scientific context in which many well-known thought experiments concerning the mind and consciousness have their roots. In particular it focuses on the problems left open by scientific theories about consciousness and by many attempts to reduce the mind to the physical world. The second part is a case study: it concentrates on the analysis of the zombie thought experiment aiming to show how a simple and rather naive image, the zombie intuition, has originated stimulating and complex arguments, enriching our philosophical and intellectual landscape. On the whole, the paper highlights the fact that there are properly philosophical questions about the mind, philosophy not being a sort of junior partner in the collective enterprise of cognitive science.