Knowledge by Experience. Or Why Physicalism Should not be our Default Position in Consciousness Studies

Summary

The argument presented challenges the prevalent belief that a physicalist view of consciousness is justified. It asserts that the arguments supporting materialism are weak and that there is a strong case against physicalism, particularly concerning phenomenal consciousness. This paper focuses on developing a common-sense argument to reject physicalism.

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Abstract

Current philosophical and scientific approaches to consciousness are very often characterised by a strong background presupposition: whatever the precise details of a theory of consciousness may be, a physicalist – or materialist – view of consciousness itself must be correct. I believe, however, that this conviction, pervasive though it may be, is not really justified. In particular, I think (1) that the arguments offered in favour of the materialist presupposition are weak and unconvincing, and (2) that there is a very strong prima facie case for rejecting physicalism regarding phenomenal consciousness. In a previous article of mine I have already discussed the first point; the present paper is devoted to elaborating the second, presenting a common-sense-based argument against physicalism.

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