Felt Time: The Phenomenological Present as the Ground of Temporal Experience

Summary

Felt Time is introduced as a fundamental aspect of conscious experience that represents the intrinsic phenomenological present, distinct from conventional time measurement. This concept suggests that our sense of 'now' is not merely a perception of time but the basis for understanding temporal concepts. A protocol is proposed to examine how Felt Time remains consistent even when perceptions of clock time change, offering new insights into consciousness and its relationship with phenomenology and neuroscience.

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Abstract

Contemporary physics increasingly suggests that time may not be fundamental, while neuroscience treats subjective temporality as constructed and elastic. Yet conscious experience is invariably characterized by a vivid sense of presence—a felt "now"—that persists across all states. This paper introduces Felt Time: the intrinsic phenomenological present that underlies all experience but is not reducible to clocks, sequences, or representations. I argue that Felt Time is not a perception of time, but the ground condition from which temporal concepts are projected. This reversal of the explanatory arrow reframes debates in phenomenology, neuroscience, and physics, and provides a candidate phenomenosignature for consciousness itself. A neurophenomenological protocol is proposed to test Felt Time's invariance across conditions where clock-time perception varies. Keywords: phenomenology, time consciousness, phenomenosignatures, temporal experience, neurophenomenology

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