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First-person approaches in neuroscience of consciousness: brain dynamics correlate with the intention to act.

Han-gue Jo, Marc Wittmann, Tilmann Lhündrup Borghardt, Thilo Hinterberger, Stefan Schmidt

Consciousness and cognition May 1, 2014 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.03.004 via PubMed

Summary

A study using a neurophenomenological approach with one expert meditator found that larger readiness potentials are linked to more frequent self-initiated movements during negative deflections of slow cortical potentials. These negative deflections coincide with an inner impulse reported by the meditator, potentially leading to voluntary actions. This research highlights how combining first-person perspectives with neural signal analysis can enhance our understanding of the neural mechanisms behind voluntary acts.

Study at a glance

Design case study
Sample size 1
Population one expert meditator
Key finding Larger readiness potentials are associated with more frequent self-initiated movements during negative deflections of slow cortical potentials.

Abstract

The belief in free will has been frequently challenged since Benjamin Libet published his famous experiment in 1983. Although Libet's experiment is highly dependent upon subjective reports, no study has been conducted that focused on a first-person or introspective perspective of the task. We took a neurophenomenological approach in an N=1 study providing reliable and valid measures of the first-person perspective in conjunction with brain dynamics. We found that a larger readiness potential (RP) is attributable to more frequent occurrences of self-initiated movements during negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials (SCP). These negative deflections occur in parallel with an inner impulse reported by an expert meditator which may in turn lead to a voluntary act. We demonstrate in this proof-of-principle approach that the first-person perspective obtained by an expert meditator in conjunction with neural signal analysis can contribute to our understanding of the neural underpinnings of voluntary acts.

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