Pluralist neurophenomenology: a reply to Lopes
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences September 1, 2025 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09892-4
Summary
The response to Lopes (2021) defends the use of multiple theoretical frameworks, including neural networks and dynamical systems theory, in studying consciousness and its neural correlates. It argues for a pluralist approach to neurophenomenology, suggesting that various methods can coexist and enhance understanding of different phenomena. Historical and conceptual arguments are presented to support this pluralism in cognitive science and phenomenology.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | A pluralist approach to neurophenomenology allows for the integration of different theoretical frameworks to study consciousness. |
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Abstract
Abstract Lopes (2021) has argued against my use of neural networks and dynamical systems theory in neurophenomenology. Responding to his argument provides an opportunity to articulate a pluralist approach to neurophenomenology, according to which multiple theoretical frameworks—symbolic, dynamical systems, connectionist, etc.—can be used to study consciousness and its relationship to neural activity. Each type of analysis is best suited to specific phenomena, but they are mutually compatible and can inform and constrain one another in non-trivial ways. I use historical and conceptual arguments to elaborate on this type of pluralism as it applies to cognitive science, phenomenology, and neurophenomenology.