Virtual Worlds of Neurophenomenology

Summary

The article examines the views of Francisco Varela and Thomas Metzinger on selfhood, revealing their distinct yet overlapping perspectives. Metzinger argues that perception is illusory and simulated, while Varela sees it as an actively constructed virtual reality. Both theorists challenge the idea of a stable self, presenting selfhood as a product of various interacting processes. Their differing ethical implications regarding self-aware AI and engagement with the world are also discussed.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In this article, the perspectives of Francisco Varela and Thomas Metzinger on the notion of selfhood are explored, highlighting their differences and similar­ities. The focus is on how the perception of self and the surrounding world is in­separable from elements of virtuality and simulation, which are vital in cognitive processes. Metzinger emphasizes perception’s illusory and simulated nature, whereas Varela considers phenomenal perception an actively created virtual real­ity. Both approaches challenge the traditional view of a stable, centralized ‘self’, seeing selfhood as the result of multiple interacting processes. Varela is centered on an enactivist vision, treating active engagement with the world as a crucial el­ement in forming selfhood. At the same time, Metzinger focuses on phenomenal self-modeling and the illusory nature of selfhood. The article also addresses the ethical differences between the two concepts. Metzinger points to potential issues in creating self-aware AI, while Varela sees in the understanding of a non-substantial ‘self’ the possibility for deeper engagement with the world, suggest­ing freedom from the constraints of rigidly stabilized selfhood and openness to diverse aspects of the environment.