A Rosetta Stone Hypothesis for Neurophenomenology: Mathematical Predictions from Predictive Processing
Lancelot da Costa, Anil K. Seth, Karl Friston, Maxwell J. D. Ramstead, Lars Sandved-smith
arXiv Preprint Archive September 30, 2024 Peer reviewed via arXiv
Summary
The study proposes a 'Rosetta Stone hypothesis' that connects consciousness (phenomenology) with behavior and neural activity through beliefs. It suggests that if phenomenology is a function of beliefs, then specific predictions can be made regarding subjective similarity judgments, cognitive metabolic costs, cognitive effort, and time perception. This approach aims to enhance the understanding of neurophenomenology by establishing connections between beliefs and neural dynamics, while noting that the link between beliefs and behavior is already well-understood.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | If phenomenology is a function of beliefs, then certain mathematical predictions about cognitive processes can be derived. |
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Abstract
Consciousness science faces the challenge of bridging first-person experience with third-person empirical measurements. Neurophenomenology aims to build such `generative passages' connecting the content of experience with behavioural and neuroscientific data. However, the mathematical machinery for such bridges remains underdeveloped. Here we develop a Rosetta Stone hypothesis from predictive processing, where beliefs serve as a central hub connecting phenomenology, behaviour, and neural dynamics. This hinges on a central technical assumption that phenomenology is a function of beliefs. We pursue a conditional approach: if this assumption holds, then certain predictions mathematically follow. We derive predictions for subjective similarity judgements, cognitive metabolic cost, subjective cognitive effort, and time perception. We review the connection between beliefs and neural dynamics to complete the generative passage for neurophenomenology, omitting the connection between beliefs and behaviour as this is already well-documented elsewhere. Testing our predictions will inform the validity of the central assumption connecting beliefs and phenomenology, and advance the neurophenomenology research programme.