Naturalizing Phenomenal Intentionality
Marking the Mark of the Mental January 1, 2025 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-98439-6_5 via Springer Nature
Summary
Phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) posits that intentionality is based on phenomenal consciousness, which allows for the intentionality of mental states. This theory shares challenges with Husserlian phenomenology, particularly regarding Cartesian skepticism and the relationship between mind and nature. A solution is proposed through a phenomenological exploration of the temporal aspects of phenomenal intentionality, combined with neutral monism (panqualityism), suggesting a way to naturalize this form of intentionality.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | A method is proposed to naturalize phenomenal intentionality by investigating its temporal nature and integrating panqualityism. |
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Abstract
According to the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), intentionality is grounded in phenomenal consciousness : the qualitative and subjective character of experience, which makes possible the intentionality of mental states. PIT is in continuity with an approach in philosophy that originated with René Descartes and that is centered on the epistemological primacy of knowledge of one’s conscious mental states, i.e. primacy of experience. However, within this approach one first encounters the problem regarding the existence of the external world (Cartesian external world skepticism). Furthermore, one also encounters the problem of the relationship between mind and nature (problem of naturalism). I identify a parallelism between PIT and Husserlian phenomenology, which also developed the notion of phenomenal intentionality. Husserlian phenomenology faces the same problems as PIT: the problem of motivating Cartesian external world skepticism and the problem of naturalism. I propose a way out of these problems through a phenomenological investigation of the temporal nature of phenomenal intentionality. By complementing phenomenology with a version of neutral monism (panqualityism), I argue that it is possible to naturalize, in a specific sense, phenomenal intentionality.