The Faithful Response to the Comforting Delusion Objection

Summary

The Comforting Delusion Objection argues that while psychedelics may improve mental well-being, they can lead to unreliable beliefs that conflict with a naturalist worldview, causing significant epistemic harm. However, the counterargument presented suggests that these metaphysical attitudes are often forms of faith rather than beliefs, which are not subject to epistemic evaluation. Thus, if no general epistemic harm occurs, the objection loses its validity.

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Abstract

Abstract The Comforting Delusion Objection is a central argument in the emerging field of Philosophy of Psychedelics. It posits that while psychedelics may benefit the mental well-being of individuals they also give rise to epistemically unreliable metaphysical beliefs that are incompatible with a naturalist worldview. Assuming naturalism is the correct stance, the result is significant epistemic harm for patients. For this reason, we should hesitate to use psychedelics as a therapeutic aid. In my counterargument, the Faithful Response, I argue that the Comforting Delusion Objection ultimately fails. This failure stems from the plausible assumption that the non-naturalistic metaphysical attitudes resulting from psychedelic experiences are often not beliefs but forms of faith. Faiths, in turn, are non-doxastic and as such, they are not suitable for epistemic evaluation. Therefore, they cannot be justifiably claimed to be epistemically harmful. If no general epistemic harm arises then the Comforting Delusion Objection loses its force.

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