A Reductive Account of Mindfulness as Metacognitive Control

Summary

Mindfulness is proposed as a unique form of metacognitive control, which differentiates it from other mental activities. Current conceptualizations of this metacognitive control are deemed insufficient. A new account suggests that mindfulness involves explicit self-awareness and self-regulation, where metacognitive control is necessary but not sufficient for mindfulness. This perspective leads to two key ideas: that metacognitive control can be reduced to other psychological capacities and that it represents a form of mental action.

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Abstract

Abstract Mindfulness is a large research field, involving disciplines such as philosophy, cognitive psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, and Buddhist studies. Despite this widespread interest, one question remains unanswered: Is there a psychological capacity that is essential to mindfulness and which demarcates mindfulness from most other mental activities? The most promising idea is that mindfulness is a special form of metacognitive control. Yet, I argue that current proposals on how to conceptualize such metacognitive control fail. Instead, I propose a novel account of the metacognitive control of mindfulness, drawing on the idea of so-called metacognitive goals. This account allows us to make sense of the explicit self-awareness and self-regulation involved in mindfulness and to separate mindfulness from exercises of more ordinary cognitive control. According to this account, metacognitive control is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for mindfulness. Finally, I argue that the account motivates two theses on the nature of mindfulness, namely that we can reduce the metacognitive control of mindfulness to other psychological capacities and that this control is a form of mental action.

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