The Shape Of Reality: Cognitive Languages and the Phenomenology of Psychosis

Summary

The hypothesis presented suggests that psychosis disrupts an individual's ability to attribute reality but maintains their native cognitive structure. It argues that the experiences associated with psychosis are rooted in the brain's existing representational systems rather than indicating a new cognitive process. The paper also outlines predictions that can be experimentally tested to encourage further research in fields like computational psychiatry and cognitive neuroscience.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This hypothesis paper proposes that psychosis preserves an individuals native cognitive architecture while disrupting reality attribution. Building on predictive processing, dreaming, and the Cognitive Languages framework, it suggests that the phenomenology of psychotic experience reflects the brain's pre-existing representational systems rather than a completely new mode of cognition. The paper presents a series of experimentally falsifiable predictions intended to stimulate empirical research in computational psychiatry, cognitive neuroscience, and mechanism-based mental health.

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