Can we trust the phenomenological interview? Metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological objections
Simon Høffding, Kristian Moltke Martiny, Andreas Roepstorff
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences July 10, 2021 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s11097-021-09744-z via OpenAlex
Summary
Phenomenological interviews are presented as a valid and reliable method for gaining knowledge, comparable to quantitative or experimental approaches. The paper addresses skepticism regarding the reliability of introspection and episodic memory, asserting that these interviews can effectively explore psychological, cognitive, and biological aspects of experience. It challenges skeptics to either accept the methodological justification of phenomenological interviews or adopt a more radical skepticism that undermines the role of conscious processes in scientific discourse.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | Phenomenological interviews are as reliable and valid as quantitative methods for understanding human experience. |
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Abstract
Abstract The paper defends the position that phenomenological interviews can provide a rich source of knowledge and that they are in no principled way less reliable or less valid than quantitative or experimental methods in general. It responds to several skeptic objections such as those raised against introspection, those targeting the unreliability of episodic memory, and those claiming that interviews cannot address the psychological, cognitive and biological correlates of experience. It argues that the skeptic must either heed the methodological and epistemological justification of the phenomenological interview provided, or embrace a more fundamental skepticism, a “deep mistrust”, in which scientific discourse can have no recourse to conscious processes as explananda , with ensuing dire consequences for our conception of science.