EXPERIÊNCIAS MÍSTICAS E A HIPÓTESE MCI

Summary

The paper argues against the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Hypothesis (MCI), which claims that religious beliefs persist due to their moderate counterintuitiveness. While MCI may explain some beliefs, it overlooks the significance of non-cognitive factors like emotions and feelings in understanding adherence. For instance, beliefs stemming from mystical experiences are better understood through the emotional states associated with those experiences, which MCI does not address.

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Abstract

In this paper an argument is presented against one of the mainstream theories in the cognitive science of religion, the Minimal Counterintuitiveness Hypothesis (MCI). The MCI hypothesis explains the adherence of religious beliefs as a function of the degree of counterintuitiveness of the concepts figuring in the belief’s content. According to MCI, religious beliefs are adherent because they deploy concepts that are moderately counterintuitive, i.e., concepts that break a small number of our natural expectations about the world. We purport that this explanation is hypercognitivist: it neglects the role of non-cognitive states in the explanation of adherence. Though MCI might effectively explain the adherence of some religious beliefs, there are religious beliefs out there whose adherence seems to be much better accounted for by reference to emotions and feelings, which the MCI hypothesis is silent about. One such example, we submit, is that of beliefs prompted by mystical experiences, whose adherence don’t seem to be satisfactorily explained without reference to affective states present in the experience.

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