Medieval Christian and Islamic Mysticism and the Problem of a “Mystical Ethics”

Summary

The chapter explores challenges in understanding the ethics of medieval Christian and Islamic mystical traditions, focusing on issues like defining mysticism, the coherence of a value theory based on the Divine as the highest Good, and the implications of antinomianism and passivity among mystics for theories of right action. It argues that these mystical traditions warrant greater attention from moral philosophy due to their practical nature.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In this chapter, we examine a few potential problems when inquiring into the ethics of medieval Christian and Islamic mystical traditions: First, there are terminological and methodological worries about defining mysticism and doing comparative philosophy in general. Second, assuming that the Divine represents the highest Good in such traditions, and given the apophaticism on the part of many mystics in both religions, there is a question of whether or not such traditions can provide a coherent theory of value. Finally, the antinomian tendencies and emphasis on passivity of some mystics might lead one to wonder whether their prescriptive exhortations can constitute a coherent theory of right action. We tackle each of these concerns in turn and discuss how they might be addressed, in an attempt to show how medieval mysticism, as a fundamentally practical enterprise, deserves more attention from practical and moral philosophy than it has thus far received.

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