Does the Philosophy of Mysticism Rest on a Mistake?
The Problem of Pure Consciousness March 29, 1990 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195059809.003.0009
Summary
Immanuel Kant opposed the idea that genuine mystical experiences could occur in this life, arguing that our cognitive faculties do not support such experiences. Despite his stance, many philosophers of mysticism have found Kant's epistemological framework to be a valuable starting point for analyzing various types of experience, including mystical ones. This reflects a significant influence of Kant's philosophy on subsequent discussions about the nature of mystical experience.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | Kant's denial of genuine mystical experience has nonetheless led many philosophers to adopt his epistemological framework as a basis for analyzing mystical experiences. |
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Abstract
Abstract Although Immanuel Kant was unremittingly hostile in his attitude toward the claims of mystics to have experience of the divine already in this life, a great many philosphers of mysticism have subsequently been attracted to the epistemological scheme of the Critical Philosophy, at least in its general outlines. Kant denied the possibility of genuine mystical experience (as opposed to merely mislabeled feelings of illumination) because such experience would require the possession in our present state of cognitive faculties for which no provision was, or seemingly could be, made in his epistemology. Yet numerous philosophers who wittingly or unwittingly have taken their lead from him have assumed that his general approach marks the most natural starting point for the analysis of all sorts of experience, including all those types typically referred to as mystical.