An active inference model of conscious access: How cognitive action selection reconciles the results of report and no-report paradigms.
Christopher J Whyte, Jakob Hohwy, Ryan Smith
Current research in neurobiology January 1, 2022 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/j.crneur.2022.100036 via PubMed
Summary
A computational model of conscious access was developed based on active inference, addressing challenges to cognitive theories posed by no-report paradigms. The model simulates a visual masking task, showing that late P3b-like event-related potentials and increased prefrontal cortex activity occur during self-report generation. Removing reporting demands reduces these ERPs and PFC activity, but the model still indicates that PFC activity can reach reportability thresholds, suggesting no-report evidence does not contradict cognitive theories of consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The simulations indicate that evidence from no-report paradigms does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness. |
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Abstract
Cognitive theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory and higher-order theories, posit that frontoparietal circuits play a crucial role in conscious access. However, recent studies using no-report paradigms have posed a challenge to cognitive theories by demonstrating conscious accessibility in the apparent absence of prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation. To address this challenge, this paper presents a computational model of conscious access, based upon active inference, that treats working memory gating as a cognitive action. We simulate a visual masking task and show that late P3b-like event-related potentials (ERPs), and increased PFC activity, are induced by the working memory demands of self-report generation. When reporting demands are removed, these late ERPs vanish and PFC activity is reduced. These results therefore reproduce, and potentially explain, results from no-report paradigms. However, even without reporting demands, our model shows that simulated PFC activity on visible stimulus trials still crosses the threshold for reportability - maintaining the link between PFC and conscious access. Therefore, our simulations show that evidence provided by no-report paradigms does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness.