Buddhist Philosophy of Mind: Nāgārjuna’s Critique of Mind-Body Dualism From His Rebirth Arguments
Philosophy East and West January 1, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1353/pew.0.0164 via OpenAlex
Summary
Dharmakīrti is presented as a mind-body dualist based on his justification for rebirth, as argued by Richard Hayes and Dan Arnold. However, Nāgārjuna's argument directly rejects Dharmakīrti's dualism and the associated rebirth theory. This comparison highlights a significant philosophical disagreement between the two thinkers regarding the nature of the mind and body.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | Nāgārjuna completely rejects the mind-body dualism of Dharmakīrti and the rebirth theory built upon it. |
|---|
Abstract
Richard Hayes (1993, 2013) and Dan Arnold (2008, 2012) have argued that Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660 C.E.) is a mind-body dualist. The proof, they say, lies in the justification he gives for his theory of rebirth. In this paper, I put Dharmakīrti’s argument to the test against a rival argument of Nāgārjuna. It turns out Nāgārjuna completely rejects the mind-body dualism of Dharmakīrti and the rebirth theory built upon it.