Experiential Presence and the Problem of Selfhood: A Candidate Invariant of Consciousness?

Summary

The paper discusses the idea that conscious experience may have a fundamental feature called experiential presence, which persists even when aspects of selfhood change. It draws on various altered states like dreaming and psychedelic experiences to suggest that while identity and agency can transform, the essence of experience remains. The concept is not framed as a definitive explanation but as a tool for exploring consciousness across different conditions, raising questions about how we study consciousness and self-knowledge.

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Abstract

This paper explores the possibility that conscious experience may possess a more fundamental and persistent feature than many forms of selfhood ordinarily associated with consciousness. Drawing upon reports from dreaming, contemplative practice, psychedelic states, nondual awareness, and other altered conditions, the paper examines a recurring observation: autobiographical identity, agency, embodiment, self-boundary, and subject-object organization may undergo substantial transformation while conscious experience itself appears to remain present. To investigate this possibility, the paper introduces the provisional concept of experiential presence, defined descriptively as the minimal fact that experience appears present at all. Experiential presence is not proposed as a metaphysical entity or explanatory mechanism, but as a heuristic construct for examining whether a candidate invariant may persist across diverse conscious conditions. Several competing interpretations are considered, including retrospective reconstruction, stable neural organization, higher-order organizational invariance, and phenomenological necessity. The paper also explores the relationship between experiential presence and existing concepts such as minimal selfhood, pre-reflective self-awareness, and minimal phenomenal experience. Beyond questions of phenomenology, the analysis raises methodological and epistemological issues concerning whether experiential presence may function not only as a feature of consciousness but also as part of the condition under which consciousness becomes available for investigation. The paper advances no claim that experiential presence has been established as universal or necessary. Instead, it aims to clarify a set of interconnected questions concerning consciousness, selfhood, invariance, and self-knowledge, and to identify directions for future empirical and theoretical research.

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