Does the Concept of “Altered States of Consciousness” Rest on a Mistake?
Adam J. Rock, Stanley Krippner
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies January 1, 2007 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.24972/ijts.2007.26.1.33 via OpenAlex
Summary
The analysis highlights that the confusion surrounding the term 'altered state of consciousness' arises from conflating consciousness with its content, termed the consciousness/content fallacy. This fallacy can be resolved by using the phrase 'altered pattern of phenomenal properties' instead. The discussion emphasizes the need to distinguish between different concepts of consciousness and their implications for theory and research.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The consciousness/content fallacy leads to confusion in understanding altered states of consciousness, which can be clarified by redefining the terminology used. |
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Abstract
Block (2002) has argued that the multiplicity of meanings ascribed to consciousness is due\nto the erroneous treatment of very different concepts as a single concept. Block distinguished\nfour notions of consciousness intended to encapsulate the various meanings attributed to\nthe term: phenomenal, access, self, and monitoring consciousness. We argue that what is\ncommon to all of these definitions is the implicit distinction between consciousness and the\ncontent of consciousness. We critically examine the term “altered state of consciousness”\nand argue that affixing the qualifier “altered state” to consciousness results in a theoretical\nconfusion of consciousness and its content, that is, consciousness is mistaken for the content\nof consciousness. We refer to this as the consciousness/content fallacy and argue that\nit may be avoided if one supplants “altered states of consciousness” with “altered pattern of\nphenomenal properties,” an extrapolation of the term “phenomenal field.” Implications of\nthe consciousness/content fallacy for theory and research are also considered.