Representationalism about Consciousness
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.19
Summary
Representationalism claims sensory consciousness consists in representing the world as being a certain way. Some philosophers argue this view supports reducing consciousness to physical processes; others contend it complicates the mind-body problem because standard reduction models fail for conscious representation. This chapter defines representationalism, presents an argument for it, examines common objections, and explores both reductive and nonreductive versions.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Representationalism can be formulated and defended, but whether it allows reduction of consciousness to physical processes remains disputed. |
Abstract
According to representationalists, sensory consciousness is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Some (Armstrong, Tye, Dretske) have suggested that representationalism fits well with the idea that consciousness can be reduced to something physical. Others think that representationalism makes the mind–body problem harder because our usual models for reducing representation do not apply in the special case of conscious representation. This chapter formulates representationalism, discusses an argument for it, and considers standard objections. The chapter concludes by looking at reductive and nonreductive representationalism.