Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.28
Summary
The chapter examines subjective measures of consciousness, which rely on participants' own reports of what they consciously perceive. A central concern is that these measures are vulnerable to response bias—participants may report seeing something when they did not, or vice versa. The author argues that researchers using subjective measures lack a clear, agreed-upon definition of subjective access, which makes the problem of response bias harder to solve. The work calls for more conceptual clarity in the science of consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Subjective measures of consciousness lack a clear notion of subjective access, which exacerbates the problem of response bias. |
Abstract
In recent years, the divide between conscious and unconscious perception has been the focus of a thriving research area in the science of consciousness. Subjective measures, frequently referred to as ‘introspective measures’, play a prominent role in this literature and have been the subject of intense criticism. This chapter discusses the main types of subjective measures used in current-day science of consciousness. I explain the key worry about such measures, namely the problem of a putatively ever-present response bias. I then turn to the question of whether subjective measures of consciousness are introspective. I show that there is no clear answer to this question, as proponents of subjective measures do not employ a worked out notion of subjective access. In turn, as I explain, this makes the problem of response bias less tractable than it might otherwise be.