Nonpositional Consciousness and the Form of Thinking: Kant and Boyle on Self-Consciousness
Canadian Journal of Philosophy April 1, 2025 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1017/can.2025.10021
Summary
This philosophical paper examines Matthew Boyle's Sartrean account of prereflective self-awareness, which aims to explain the link between self-consciousness and rationality. The author argues that Boyle's model offers tools for reinterpreting Kant's claim that the 'I think' must accompany all representations as a form of nonpositional consciousness. However, the author also contends that Boyle's approach risks fragmenting the unity of the subject across different representational domains, and that Kant's account, understood as a kind of prereflective consciousness, can address this challenge.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Boyle's Sartrean account of prereflective self-awareness risks fragmenting the unity of the subject, but Kant's account, construed as prereflective consciousness, has resources to address this challenge. |
Abstract
Abstract In Transparency and Reflection , Matthew Boyle offers a Sartrean account of prereflective self-awareness to explain the essential link between self-consciousness and rationality, moving away from standard Kantian interpretations that he claims presuppose rather than explain this connection. I argue that Boyle’s account provides useful tools for re-interpreting Kant’s claim that the “I think” must accompany all representations as a form of nonpositional consciousness. I also aim to show that Boyle’s model risks fragmenting the unity of the subject across different representational domains, and that Kant’s account (construed as a kind of prereflective consciousness) has the resources to address this challenge.