Emergence and Consciousness
Philosophy October 1, 2013 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1017/s0031819113000508
Summary
This paper offers a purely metaphysical definition of emergentism and property emergence, arguing that emergentism requires a Humean view of causation. It critiques emergentism as both a general metaphysics and an account of consciousness, claiming it makes implausible claims about how the world works. The author notes that most contemporary property dualists hold views effectively identical to classical emergentism, minus the historical commitment to novel emergent forces.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Emergentism, as a metaphysical doctrine, entails a Humean account of causation and makes implausible claims about how the world works, including as an account of consciousness. |
Abstract
AbstractMost definitions of radical emergentism characterize it epistemologically. This leads to misunderstandings and makes it hard to assess the doctrine's metaphysical worth. This paper puts forward purely metaphysical characterizations of emergentism and property emergence. It explores the nature of the necessitation relation between base and emergent and argues that emergentism entails a Humean account of causation and related relations. Then it presents arguments against emergentism, both as a wider metaphysic and as an account of consciousness. These maintain that emergentism makes implausible claims about how the world works. The paper also stresses the doctrine's contemporary relevance: most current property dualists endorse views effectively identical to classical emergentism less its historical commitment to novel emergent forces.