The Argument from Consciousness and Divine Consciousness
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion March 21, 2013 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v5i1.254
Summary
This paper refines the argument from consciousness by emphasizing the first-person perspective as a distinctive aspect of consciousness that supports a theistic explanation. It uses knowledge arguments to counter a posteriori materialism and suggests that divine knowledge is better understood as knowledge of things rather than knowledge of facts.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The first-person perspective of consciousness uniquely supports a theistic explanation, and divine knowledge should be interpreted as knowledge of things rather than knowledge of facts. |
Abstract
The paper aims for an improvement of the so-called argument from consciousness while focusing on the first-person-perspective as a unique feature of consciousness that opens the floor for a theistic explanation. As a side effect of knowledge arguments, which are necessary to keep a posterior materialism off bounds, the paper proposes an interpretation of divine knowledge as knowledge of things rather than knowledge of facts.