Downgraded phenomenology: how conscious overflow lost its richness.
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0355 via PubMed
Summary
Visual awareness is sparse, not rich, as shown by change blindness and inattentional blindness. When memory or comparison failures are excluded, these phenomena provide strong evidence against rich awareness. Theories of phenomenal consciousness must downgrade phenomenology to a degree where it is functionless or does not reflect actual experience.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | Failures of awareness such as change blindness and inattentional blindness, once memory and comparison failures are ruled out, provide strong evidence that visual awareness is sparse, not rich. |
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Abstract
Our in-the-moment experience of the world can feel vivid and rich, even when we cannot describe our experience due to limitations of attention, memory or other cognitive processes. But the nature of visual awareness is quite sparse, as suggested by the phenomena of failures of awareness, such as change blindness and inattentional blindness. I will argue that once failures of memory or failures of comparison are ruled out as explanations for these phenomena, they present strong evidence against rich awareness. To accommodate and explain these massive failures of awareness, any theory of phenomenal consciousness must downgrade phenomenology to a degree where it is functionless or, ironically, does not reflect what we experience.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.