Fish do not feel pain and its implications for understanding phenomenal consciousness.
Biology & philosophy January 1, 2015 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s10539-014-9469-4 via PubMed
Summary
Humans often assume animals feel pain if they react to harmful stimuli, but this may be incorrect for fish. The abstract argues that fish respond to noxious stimuli only reflexively, with limited behavior, and lack the neural structures—found in mammals and birds—required for phenomenal consciousness. Therefore, the author concludes that fish do not experience pain or affective states.
Study at a glance
| Design | review |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Fish lack the essential neural architecture for phenomenal consciousness and therefore do not feel pain. |
Abstract
Phenomenal consciousness or the subjective experience of feeling sensory stimuli is fundamental to human existence. Because of the ubiquity of their subjective experiences, humans seem to readily accept the anthropomorphic extension of these mental states to other animals. Humans will typically extrapolate feelings of pain to animals if they respond physiologically and behaviourally to noxious stimuli. The alternative view that fish instead respond to noxious stimuli reflexly and with a limited behavioural repertoire is defended within the context of our current understanding of the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of mental states. Consequently, a set of fundamental properties of neural tissue necessary for feeling pain or experiencing affective states in vertebrates is proposed. While mammals and birds possess the prerequisite neural architecture for phenomenal consciousness, it is concluded that fish lack these essential characteristics and hence do not feel pain.