Quining diet qualia.
Consciousness and cognition June 1, 2012 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.04.001 via PubMed
Summary
The paper argues that there is no neutral common ground for theories of phenomenal consciousness. The classic view of qualia as intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective cannot serve as a shared explanandum, and the watered-down 'diet' version of qualia is empty. Stripping qualia of those three features leaves no distinctive content. Therefore, if classic qualia realism is rejected, only our dispositions to judge that experiences have classic qualia remain; diet qualia should be eliminated.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Diet qualia have no distinctive content, so if classic qualia realism is rejected, only dispositions to judge that experiences have classic qualia remain, and diet qualia should be eliminated. |
Abstract
This paper asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The 'classic' conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down 'diet' conception will. I argue that this is wrong and that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive content. There is no phenomenal residue left when qualia are stripped of their intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity. Thus, if we reject classic qualia realism, we should accept that all that needs explaining are 'zero' qualia - our dispositions to judge that our experiences have classic qualia. Diet qualia should, in Dennett's phrase, be quined.