The irrelevance of folk intuitions to the "hard problem" of consciousness.

Summary

Folk intuitions about mental states are unlikely to reveal truths about phenomenal consciousness. Current experimental philosophy studies, such as those by Sytsma and Machery, draw on judgments produced by System One cognitive processes. These automatic judgments would occur regardless of whether phenomenal consciousness exists, making them unreliable evidence for consciousness or its concept. To meaningfully investigate phenomenal consciousness, experimental philosophy must ground its methods in a deeper understanding of how people form judgments.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Recently, a number of philosophers have turned to folk intuitions about mental states for data about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I argue that current research along these lines does not tell us about these subjects. I focus on a series of studies, performed by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery, to make my argument. Folk judgments studied by these researchers are mostly likely generated by a certain cognitive system - System One - that will generate the same data whether or not we experience phenomenal consciousness. This is a problem for a range of current experimental philosophy research into consciousness or our concept of it. If experimental philosophy is to shed light into phenomenal consciousness, it needs to be better founded in an understanding of how we make judgments.