Access is mainly a second-order process: SDT models whether phenomenally (first-order) conscious states are accessed by reflectively (second-order) conscious processes.

Summary

The distinction between first-order access (consciousness) and second-order access (metacognitive reflection) is important. Exclusion failure can isolate phenomenally conscious stimuli lacking second-order access. The 'partial access argument' fails because exclusion failure stems from absent second-order access, not insufficient conscious information. The 'enable account' better explains qualitative differences and subjective report than the 'endow account'. Second-order access reflects the core meaning of access generally.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Access can either be first-order or second-order. First order access concerns whether contents achieve representation in phenomenal consciousness at all; second-order access concerns whether phenomenally conscious contents are selected for metacognitive, higher order processing by reflective consciousness. When the optional and flexible nature of second-order access is kept in mind, there remain strong reasons to believe that exclusion failure can indeed isolate phenomenally conscious stimuli that are not so accessed. Irvine's [Irvine, E. (2009). Signal detection theory, the exclusion failure paradigm and weak consciousness-Evidence for the access/phenomenal distinction? Consciousness and Cognition.] partial access argument fails because exclusion failure is indeed due to lack of second-order access, not insufficient phenomenally conscious information. Further, the enable account conforms with both qualitative differences and subjective report, and is simpler than the endow account. Finally, although first-order access may be a distinct and important process, second-order access arguably reflects the core meaning of access generally.