Sidestepping the semantics of "consciousness".
The Behavioral and brain sciences April 1, 2004 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x0421007x via PubMed
Summary
The author argues that Ned Block's claim that the term "consciousness" is ambiguous between phenomenal and access consciousness relies on an unclear notion of ambiguity. The conflation of these two types of consciousness can be explained without assuming the term is ambiguous. Therefore, Block's argument could be strengthened by sidestepping controversial semantic issues about the word "consciousness."
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Block's argument that "consciousness" is ambiguous between phenomenal and access consciousness is not obvious, and the conflation can be explained without this ambiguity. |
Abstract
Block explains the conflation of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness by appeal to the ambiguity of the term "consciousness." However, the nature of ambiguity is not at all clear, and the thesis that "consciousness" is ambiguous between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness is far from obvious. Moreover, the conflation can be explained without supposing that the term is ambiguous. Block's argument can thus be strengthened by avoiding controversial issues in the semantics of "consciousness."