How many kinds of consciousness?

Summary

The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, widely used in consciousness studies, relies on unexamined theoretical assumptions that favor certain views. Phenomenal and access consciousness, as defined by Ned Block, do not pick out distinct properties of conscious mental states. The notion of access consciousness does not capture what it means for a mental state to be conscious, and phenomenal consciousness conflates two different mental properties. Distinguishing these properties allows for an explanation of qualitative consciousness through models like the higher-order-thought hypothesis.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Ned Block's influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that have qualitative character plainly differ from those with no mental qualities, a mental state's being conscious is the same property for both kinds of mental state. For one thing, as Block describes access consciousness, that notion does not pick out any property that we intuitively count as a mental state's being conscious. But the deeper problem is that Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness, or phenomenality, is ambiguous as between two very different mental properties. The failure to distinguish these results in the begging of important theoretical questions. Once the two kinds of phenomenality have been distinguished, the way is clear to explain qualitative consciousness by appeal to a model such as the higher-order-thought hypothesis.