The developmental gap in phenomenal experience: a comment on J. G. Taylor's "cortical activity and the explanatory gap".

Summary

A neural network model for phenomenal consciousness explains its persistence and unity but fails to account for nonlinear local-global brain interactions. Its assumptions that experience is immediate and incorrigible limit understanding of how consciousness changes across development. Recent evidence shows neurobehavioral development is discontinuous, with judgment emerging under uncertainty to align feeling and perception. A developmental approach may resolve the paradox of feeling both infinitely close to and distant from oneself.

Study at a glance

Abstract

J. G. Taylor advances an empirically testable local neural network model to understand the neural correlates of phenomenal experience. Taylor's model is better able to explain the presence (i.e., persistence, latency, and seamlessness) and unity of phenomenal consciousness which support the idea that consciousness is coherent, undivided, and centered. However, Taylor fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of the nonlinear relationship between local and global neural systems. In addition, the ontological assumptions that PE is immediate, intrinsic, and incorrigible limit an understanding of the different experiential forms consciousness takes during neurobehavioral development. Recent studies suggest that neurobehavioral development is discontinuous and that judgment emerges under conditions of uncertainty to render feeling and perception in equivalent terms of energy and behavior. Approaching the problem of phenomenal experience from a developmental perspective may help resolve the paradox of feeling infinitely close as well as distant from one's self.